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Abstract 
National holidays are some of the oldest known forms of nation-mythologizing used for 
managing, producing and reproducing national memories and identities. They are 
calendrically set aside days free from work where a people pause and reflect on who 
they are as a nation. A study of national holidays in the Zimbabwean context exposes 
the malleability, fragility and contestability of ‘official’ notions of nationhood as 
imagined by Zimbabwean president and the ruling Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic 
Front’s (ZANU-PF) leader - Robert Mugabe. This article contends that national 
holidays have been adulterated by Mugabe who, when presiding over them, fuses the 
personal and national by speaking both as an individual, president of the country and 
leader of ZANU-PF for politically expedient ends. With this in mind, this article 
devotes its focus to the study and analysis of Mugabe’s speeches on three most cathartic 
national holidays, namely, Heroes Day, Defence Forces Day and Independence Day, as 
covered in state controlled The Herald newspaper between 2000-2014. This article uses 
analyses Mugabe’s speeches and performances of the nation during commemorations 
and argues that by subjecting them toand argues that that Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic power, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Discourse Historical Analysis 
(DHA). The article concludes by arguing that Mugabe has used these commemorations 
to carve a dictatorial, exclusive, toxic and narrow version of national being.  
Keywords: National holidays, national identity, memory, patriotic memory, 
commemorative events, public media, patriotic history 
Introduction 
National holidays are some of the oldest known forms of nation-mythologizing 
practices used for managing, producing and reproducing national memories and 
identities (McCrone and McPherson 2009, Lentz 2013, Willems 2013,Mpofu 2014). 
They are calendrically set aside days free from work where a people pause and reflect 
on who they are as a nation. A study of national holidays in the Zimbabwean context 
exposes the malleability, fragility and contestability of ‘official’ notions of nationhood 
as imagined by Zimbabwean president and the ruling Zimbabwe National Union 
Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) leader - Robert Mugabe. This article contends that 
national holiday ceremonies have been adulterated by Mugabe who, when presiding 
over them, fuses the personal and the national by speaking both as an individual, 
president of the country and as leader of ZANU-PF, for selfish politically expedient 
ends. With this in mind, this article devotes its focus to the study and analysis of 
Mugabe’s speeches on three most cathartic national holidays, namely, Heroes’ Day, 
Defence Forces’ Day and Independence Day, as covered in the state controlled The 
Herald newspaper between 2000-2014.  
 
The selected period is significant. as iIt is characterised by political and economic crises 
that have assumed global prominence, including a tension-filled and shaky Government 
of National Unity (GNU) between ZANU-PF and the opposition parties between 2009-
2013. Even though important, due to space constraints, national holiday celebrations 
during the GNU period are not catered for in this study and call for a separate study 
altogether. The intention of the article is to demonstrate the critical role that discursive 
practices related to selected national holidays from 2000 to 2014 have played in the 
consolidation of Mugabe and by default ZANU-PF’s stranglehold on power in the face 
of overwhelming mass dissent, intra-party tensions and socio-political ruptures. In the 
article I argue and demonstrate that Mugabe is a toxic leader who has contaminated 
national holidays for his political survival and legitimacy as an individual first and, 
secondly, for legitimising ZANU-PF’s stranglehold on power using its real or perceived 
accomplishments. This toxicity is informed by what can be called Mugabeism; an 
appreciation of Mugabe as an authoritarian, chauvinist, liberator and paranoid 
nationalist (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a; see also Zizek 1989). Specifically, the paper 
attempts to answer the following questions: How has Mugabe manipulated national 
holidays? To what end has he chosen to celebrate and preside over the performance of 
the nation during national holidays in such a manner? What do the commemorative 
speeches mean to the Zimbabwean national identity project? To answer these questions 
this article uses Mugabe’s speeches and performances of the nation during 
commemorations by subjecting them to Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) one of the 
theoretical approaches within CDA.  
 
The public media have been central in publicising the activities surrounding the 
celebrations of these holidays – giving Mugabe and his ZANU-PF a central role in the 
making of the nation and festivities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009). The 
coverage of these days is a project worthy of investigation in its own right. This paper 
limits itself to Mugabe’s speeches, usually published in full by the public media which 
also, interestingly, run some excerpts of the speeches as part of their news coverage a 
day after the commemorations and usually on the first page. This focus makes this 
research path breaking in the context where there has not be an in-depth study on the 
toxicity of the performances on national holidays and their (ab)use in the construction of 
national identity in Zimbabwe. However, it is important to add here that this work adds 
to an already growing body of work literature on nationalism in Zimbabwe. Three 
important texts that relate to my current research come into mind and these are 
informative. First is Wendy Willems’s (2013) article on the changing meanings, 
aesthetics and celebrations of Zimbabwe’s independence. Like this current article, 
Willems (2013) is concerned with how ZANU-PF has used the Independence Day 
celebrations to wage a political ‘turf’ war against the opposition Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC). Thus the Independence dayDay celebrations transformed 
from celebrating commemorating the birth of the nation through a bloody war against 
the colonists into a battle ‘through which ZANU-PF sought to justify its own rule 
[through delegitimising] the MDC as a social force” (Willems 2013, 22). In Second 
2009 Ndlovu-Gatsheni wrote a book, Do Zimbabweans exist?(2009) wherein hewhere 
he questioned questions the prescriptive constructions of the nation by ZANU-PF and 
concludesd that Zimbabweans do not exist. He also grapples with the strategies, most of 
them adulterating the nation, used by ZANU-PF to hail Zimbabweans into an imagined 
cohesive Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni also raises the question of Mugabe’s centrality 
and almost Messianic status in the political matrix of Zimbabwe which he refer’s to as 
Mugabeism. This is dealt with later in the article but suffice it to say that Ndlovu-
Gatsheni’s (2009b) text is path-breaking in that it draws from many sources and 
analyses a number of tactics to demonstrate how ZANU-PF has selfichlyselfishly 
attempted to construct a nation outside the participation of the masses. Another Lastly, 
incisive text by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems (2009) addresses issues of cultural 
nationalism, and the politics of commemoration and nation-making through analysing 
music galas. The paper addresses the issue of music galas bashes and commemorations, 
in order to consider the type of nation that was being celebrated, performed and 
commemorated in the post-2000 period. They use Mugabe’s speeches during the 
holidays to demonstrate the narrow version of citizenship constructed by ZANU-PF and 
Mugabe through the use of public holidays and the ‘sell-out’ nature of the MDC. This is 
also raised in this article. This article adds to this already existing literature. citizenship. 
Besides, There has been a lot of other important and valuable works on Zimbabwe’s 
nationalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a, Tendi 2008, Kriger 1995 and 2003, Ranger 2004) 
that have given critical interventions on Zimbabwe’s nationalism but few have 
attempted to give a sustained critique of Mugabe’s rhetoric and how he has selfishly 
used national holidays to give a self-serving narrative that helps preserve his personal 
and power interests. What makes it unique is that it analyses and subjects Mugabe’s 
speeches during national holidays between 2000 and 2014 to Critical CDA Discourse 
Analysis, DHA and Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power. There has been a lot of other 
important and valuable works on Zimbabwe’s nationalism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009a, 
Tendi 2008, Kriger 1995 and 2003, Ranger 2004) that have given critical interventions 
on Zimbabwe’s nationalism but few have attempted to give a sustained critique of 
Mugabe’s rhetoric and how he has selfishly used national holidays to give a self-serving 
narrative that helps preserve his personal and power interests. Thus this is the entry 
point of this paper into debates on nationalism in Zimbabwe: the use and subjection to 
CDA of Mugabe’s rhetoric during national holidays between 2000 and 2014 and how 
these feed into salient themes Mugabe has used to imagine his preferred version of 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Significantly there is no agreement on the usefulness of national holidays as catalysts 
for national unity.  In a book National Identity, Anthony Smith (1991) lists certain 
artefacts considered important to the construction of national identities and missing 
from that lengthy catalogue are national holidays. Geisler (2009) argues that nNational 
holidays are seen as unstable signifiers hence they need not be taken seriously as 
enduring signifiers unlike heroes’ burial sites, statues, costumes, coinage, anthems, 
parades and flags among others. Further, national holiday dates are mostly contested 
and mean different things to different people, as is demonstrated by studies on Western 
nationalism (Geisler 2009, McCrone 2009, Nyyssönen, 2009). What sustains national 
affections, these studies suggest, are physical, monumental signifiers. However, in a 
country like Zimbabwe where even the physical monuments are so imposing that they 
end up emotionally alienating andor tainted (Mpofu, 2014), where currencies lose value 
to an extent of being symbols of shame, ridicule, contestation or  used as toilet paper, it 
becomes difficult to appreciate these as national signifiers but as artefacts of ridicule 
and contestation.  
 
In this context, national holidays may be put in the same bracket of importance with 
theare equally important as the artefacts listed by Smith (1991). Thus Lentz’s (2013) 
paper on 2010 independence jubilees in Africa is illuminating as she pointings out the 
centrality of national holidays to the nations arguing that. Of particular relevance is 
Lentz’s assertion that the performances of the nation in these days ‘reflect the fault lines 
with which African nation-building has to contend, such as competing political 
orientations…’ (2013, 217). This relates to the performances of the nation in Zimbabwe 
where Mugabe as a central figure manages the slippery concept of the nation and its 
discordant contenders (Willems 2013; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems 2009). While the 
competing political orientations are silent in my paperhere, they can easily be 
intertextually and interdiscursively (Titscher and Jenner 2000) read from Mugabe’s 
addresses. Lentz’s (2013) argument that Independence Day celebrations in Africa are 
moments of debating the past, present and future and supported by citizens seems not to 
hold in the Zimbabwean context where holidays are couched as ZANU-PF projects that 
exclude voices that rail against the dominant discourse set by Mugabe. Masunungure 
(2005), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a, 2009b), Werbner (1998a and b) and Worby (1998) are 
some notable scholars who have come close to addressing the toxification of 
nationalism by Mugabe. Werbner (1998) argues that the performance of these holidays, 
while much as they are stable in that they occur on set days that have not changed since 
independence in 1980, reveal the fragility of nation formation under Mugabe.  
 
Worby’s (1998) research is centred on how power is performed during national holidays 
and agricultural shows presided over by provincial leaders in the Midlands region. He 
argues that power, while being performed at the centre by the political elite, is also 
contested at the periphery - especially by subaltern ethnic groups. Worby (1998), 
focusing on the 1984 Independence Day celebrations, illustrates how Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF used developmentalist and often violent discourses to consolidate their 
power. What makes my paper’s contribution unique is its utilisation and subjection of 
Mugabe’s speeches to CDA and DHA during three holidays at a time when the country 
is undergoing political, economic and social crises. In addition, this is the time 
characterised by contested election results and ZANU-PF’s intraparty fissures within 
ZANU-PF that recently led to the firing dismissal of senior party members by Mugabe 
himself in 2015. This and other violent forms of dealing with difference continues to 
hallmark Mugabe’s postcolonial nationalist project which can at best,  be described as 
toxic.  
 
The lense of toxicity is also unique to this particular research as it provides a framework 
to critique the way national holidays have mutated into serving Mugabe’s selfish 
interests. I call this ‘toxification’ of national holidays and identities following American 
academic Lipman-Bluman’s (2011) thesis on toxic leaders.  She defines toxic leaders as 
those who have deliberately harmed their people, organisations and institutions. 
Mugabe’s behaviour of inhibiting the blossoming of a multiplicity of ethnic, political 
and social identities to come together in the creation of a Zimbabwean national mosaic 
could be classified as toxic along these lines. As a toxic leader he is likely to leave the 
country worse off after his leadership than he found it at independence in 1980, and to 
in fact reverse the gains the country made in the 1990s.  
 
The itinerary of this article is as follows: it starts by briefly locating Mugabe’s speeches 
and their centrality to ‘official’ discourse in Zimbabwe. Then follows a discussion on 
and grounding of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power and CDA and DHA as 
frameworks. This is immediately followed by a discussion of the performance of the 
nation in and during national holidays by Mugabe starting with Heroes’ and Defence 
Forces’ Days, followed by Independence Day before concluding. The specific focus is 
on their performances and the textual narratives from Mugabe. Finally a brief discussion 
on the commemoration of national holidays during and after the GNU ends the 
discussion.  
 
Presidential speeches 
This article looks at Mugabe’s speeches as published in The Herald newspaper. Media 
comprise some of the integral institutions as carriers of ideologies in the often 
conflictual process of national identity construction. Anderson (1991) argues that the 
formation of Western European nations is inextricably linked to modern developments 
contingent, among other things, on print capitalism, map, census and museum. This 
signposts the centrality of the media in the formation and understanding of the nation 
(Morley, 1992). Elsewhere, Sumartojo (2012, 2) suggests that there are other pre-
modern ethnic cultural forms and structural effects linked to national formation such as 
‘national territory, myths and memories, legal rights and duties, the economy and “a 
common mass public culture”’ where the media cannot be credited with national 
formation. Zimbabwe’s postcolonial nationalism can be said to be informed partly by 
the collective resistance and subsequent military dismantlement of the colonial system 
leading to independence in 1980. The capture of the state by Mugabe and ZANU-PF the 
skewing of the country’s history and national identity discourses  towards war-centred 
and patriotism themes. 
 
National holiday celebrations that are the focus of this article are usually addressed by 
Mugabe in his personal capacity, as state and ZANU-PF president; and also in his role 
as Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces. Most Zimbabweans cannot make it to 
the venues and rely on news media like the television, radio or newspapers for reports 
on what transpired. It is crucial to observe that private media have played an adversarial 
role in countering Mugabe’s dominant narratives – subjecting his speeches, behaviour 
and rulership to critiques inspired by democracy, human rights and economic 
liberalisation discourse. This article is concerned with national identity construction as 
seen through Mugabe’s speeches at a time when his political legitimacy faced local and 
international resistance, the socio-political and economic of most Zimbabweans was 
dire leading to mass migration. The use of Mugabe’s speeches from The Herald suffices 
for a number of reasons. Mugabe’s speeches during these holidays act asare  
hermeneutical sites for the formation of and amplification of government policy, 
collective memory and identity. Chang and Hold further suggest that presidential 
speeches are important rhetorical rituals and ‘governing tool[s] since “... presidential 
speech[es] and action[s] increasingly reflect the opinions that speaking is actually 
governing”’ (Ceaser et al., cited in Chang and Holt 2009, 304). The president, by virtue 
of the power vested in his office, not only commands the state repressive apparatus, but 
commands the nation as a whole.  In addition, these ceremonial speeches, as shall be 
demonstrated later, are used to: 
strengthen bonds between speaker and listeners and among listeners themselves, building a sense of 
community.  To create a sense of community, they usually create a sense of presence for particular ideas 
and values. They bring to the forefront of consciousness some value or belief that a group holds but may 
not have thought much about, which makes people aware that they share important values and beliefs… 
and draw people together. (Zarefsky 2008: 430) 
 
Language, Symbolic Power and Discourse Historical Approach 
This section briefly discusses Symbolic Power, CDA and DHA. Bourdieu defines 
symbolic power as the power ‘to construct reality which tends to establish a 
gnoseological order; the immediate meaning (sens) of the world (particularly of the 
social world)’ (1979, 79). In 1991 he further refined this definition of symbolic power 
to mean: 
A power constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of 
confirming or transforming the vision of the world, and, thereby, action on the world and thus 
the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is 
obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of 
mobilisation. (Bourdieu 1991, 170) 
 
The public media and some ‘patriotic’ scholars have been instrumental in rallying 
identity debates behind Mugabe’s preferred dominant ideologies and, in the process, 
producing and justifying the ‘naturalness’ of ‘class divisions among both the dominant 
and the dominated’ (Girling 2004, 43), where the established socio-politico-economic 
order is seen ‘as natural (orthodoxy) through masked (and hence misrecognised) 
imposition of classificatory systems’ (Bourdieu 1979, 82). Theyose entities that advance 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF ideologies seem to wield the power of legitimate 
pronouncement, that is, the power to ‘diagnose, classify, authorise, and represent both 
individuals and the world, and to have this power of legitimate naming not just taken 
seriously, but taken-for-granted’ (Loader 1997, 4) by society. Mugabe has attempted to 
maintain his political legitimacy through the master narrative of ‘patriotic’ history 
advanced by patriotic public intellectuals who regularly feature in public media like 
Sheunesu Mupepereki, Vimbai Chivaura and Claude Mararike from the University of 
Zimbabwe. There is no variegated debate in public media on Mugabe’s dominant 
discourses which are rarely contested and have gained a taken-for-granted status. As the 
article progress it becomes clear that Mugabe believes the uncontestable nature of his 
rhetoric through repeatedly using certain words to describe the opposition or those 
against his rulership of Zimbabwe for example. 
 
The DHA is closely related to CDA. DHA proposes a multi-dimensional deconstruction 
of discourse by looking at particular issues in detail, including the historical dimensions 
and topoi (van Leeuwen 1993, van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). CDA factors in the use 
of both written and spoken discourse as a form of social practice (Fairclough and 
Wodak 1997; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). CDA is used to analyse both “opaque 
and transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control 
as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer 2001, 2). CDA and DHAThese help me 
one to look beyond the performances and spectacle during these holiday 
commemorations, and analyse what their intended net effects are. These three 
approaches are critical as they position language and communication central to the 
performances of holiday ceremonies.   
 
Defence Forces’ and Heroes’ Days: Defending and memorialising the nation  
The Defence Forces’ Day is meant to celebrate the living men and women who serve in 
the country’s security forces while the Heroes’ Day is meant to ‘remember the gallant 
liberators who gave up their lives to free this country’ (The Herald, 11/08/2004). These 
days are usually characterised by military displays, poetry, sports and music. The 
highlight is the presidential speech which usually emphasise the history and activities of 
the defence forces and the role heroes played in liberating Zimbabwe. During the 
Defence Forces’ Day Mugabe gives an overview of their work and future plans. This 
could be gleaned  from a speech in 2004 where Mugabe said ‘the Forces have 
successfully undertaken a number of activities and today’s occasion gives them an 
opportunity to reflect on their past operations as well as come up with relevant future 
plans’ (The Herald, 10/08/2005). The 2006 Defence Forces’ Day was curious for its 
theme Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Safeguarding National Interests. The subtext is the 
need to defend the nation from the threat posed by the MDC who, according to ZANU-
PF, intended to pawn the country back to the former colonisers. It links with Mugabe’s 
sentiments in the 2004 commemorations where when he said:   
Government will always continue to give priority to the Defence Forces’ training and equipment 
programmes in order to ensure the existence of a credible defence system capable of defending 
the gains of our hard-won Independence.… The enemy's machinations can never make us forget 
that we got Zimbabwe after a protracted liberation struggle. (The Herald, 11/08/ 2004) 
To reiterate, Mugabe has consistently used the discourse of re-colonisation to discredit 
the pro-democracy movements in an attempt to maintain a stranglehold on power. The 
suggestion in the extract above is that anyone who challenges ZANU-PF becomes an 
enemy and there is an exaggerated sense of danger posed by the MDC hence the need to 
have a defence system in place. This is strengthened by the narrative that the West is 
using the MDC to plunder Zimbabwe’s gains of independence. Notice how Mugabe 
subtly clusters the MDCs, the West and the Bretton Woods institutions together as 
Zimbabwe’s enemies: 
Since we embarked on redistributing land to the indigenous majority, those who wanted to 
continue controlling our natural resources not only imposed illegal sanctions against the country, 
but also withdrew or influenced the withdrawal balance of payments support, and have made 
every effort to isolate our country from the international community. (Mugabe, 12/08/2007) 
 
The land reform programme was not the sole reason for Zimbabwe’s ‘punishment’ by 
the West through sanctions, but was one of theseems convenient onesfor ZANU-PF’s 
victimhood narrative. It is true that sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe after the 
chaotic land reform that largely affected white farm owners and their black labourers 
but to lay the blame for the country’s economic woes solely on the West or sanctions is 
political expediency. The breakdown of rule of law, corruption, Mugabe’s dictatorial 
tendencies together with the ‘targeted’ sanctions allalso contributed to the country’s 
problems. This is not to rule out intentions by the West to rid Zimbabwe of Mugabe. In 
2013 the former president of South Africa said that former British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, pressured him into participating in a military regime change project in Zimbabwe. 
He is quoted as saying: 
 
There were other people saying, ‘Yes indeed there are political problems, economic problems, 
the best way to solve them is regime change. So Mugabe must go’... There is a retired chief of 
the British armed forces who said he had to withstand pressure … from …from the then prime 
minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair ... who was saying to the chief of the British armed 
forces,… ‘You must work out a military plan so that we can physically remove Robert 
Mugabe’... we had come under the same pressure that we need to cooperate in some scheme... 
even to the point of using military force and we were saying no. (The Guardian Online, 2013). 
 
This is not to argue that Mugabe’s superintending over a chaotic land reform was done 
with the interests of the landless majority at heart but it was meant for political survival 
in the face of a collapsing economy, high inflation, strong political opposition and high 
unemployment rates with an increasingly disillusioned populace some of whom actively 
participated in labour unrests and food riots of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
The Heroes’ Day is usually commemorated at the National Heroes’ Acre, a 
controversial shrine that has been contested as having lost its national appeal, as 
seemingly only ZANU-PF members, even those who did not participate in the war of 
liberation (Willems 2013) are conferred a hero status and their remains interred there 
(Mpofu 2014). According to The Herald, ‘The Heroes’ Day was set aside as a public 
holiday so that Zimbabweans can have a chance to remember the gallant fighters who 
died during the liberation struggle against white settler rule’ (The Herald, 10/08/2004). 
In the same vein it is defined by Mugabe as a day of ‘underscoring the centrality, 
indeed, the inviolability of the liberation struggle in the past, present and future life of 
our country. Zimbabwe ndeyeropa! Zimbabwe sayithola ngempi! [Trans: Zimbabwe 
was won through the spilling of blood!]’ (The Herald, 10/08/2004). Further, in 2013 
Mugabe said about the day: 
[it] is a revered national custom of commemorating and paying tribute to the fallen and 
living heroes of our liberation struggle, whose blood and suffering brought the 
cherished one-man-one-vote, the land and independence we call ours. (The Herald, 
13/08/2013) 
 
The rhetoric around blood spilled during the liberation war connects the living and 
departed blacks to their destiny and dreams of an independent and democratic 
Zimbabwe. Besides, the presidential speeches in the period under study demonstrate 
‘our resolve and pledge that Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again’ (The Herald, 
10/08/2004) and this calls for a militant and aggressive defence of the nation and 
willingness to shed blood for the cause as did the liberation war fighters. So tThese days 
are sites of celebration commemoration, as much as moments to send messages to the 
country’s enemies whileand for persuading Zimbabweans to stand behindsupport 
Mugabe in the face of the “colonial masters and their puppets”. In the face of 
uncertainty and vulnerability, characterised by alternative narratives on democracy and 
competing political loyalties, Mugabe has not only militarised his regime (Saul and 
Saunders 2005) but has reworked and appropriated different myths, symbols and 
traditions and presented these as fundamental to the survival of the nation. Another 
myth that has gained a taken-for-granted status is that the MDC was working on selling 
‘our’ gains of independence to the British hence ‘we’ needed to protect these - leading 
to the ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’ slogan circulated in the official public 
sphere. The rituals at the Heroes’ Acre where Heroes’ Day is commemorated are 
structured in a complex way where at one moment the masses are put onare relegated to 
the margins and, at another, made to feel as part of the proceedings.  
 
The coerced participation of citizens gives an impression that they are rubberstamping 
in approval the bureaucratic ways Mugabe and ZANU-PF employ in dispensing state 
power when in fact their role in the whole performance is that of a captive audience. 
State power here is performed as a nexus of bureaucracy, ritual and discourse which 
pretends to be less determined by Mugabe alone but is instead displayed as ‘open 
governance’ where ‘people’ feel involved in its acquisition and performance. National 
holidays and monuments like the Heroes’ Acre for example have proven crucial sites 
for Mugabe’s production of dominant narratives on the nation especially at critical 
points of political and economic crises. ZANU-PF’s heightened nationalism discourse, 
hailing Zimbabweans into sacred communion, is accompanied by narratives on the need 
to preserve ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s legacy and contribution to the country’s 
independence - itself a convoluted patriotic history (Ranger, 2004) written by ZANU-
PF patriotic scholars-for Mugabe’s political survival. Memories of the past (especially 
colonial) experiences are therefore important to Mugabe’s political survival project as 
these are recalled for ‘Zimbabweans’ to make sense of their past, history and future. 
The following extract from Mugabe’s speech captures the preceding points: 
This national shrine [Heroes’ Acre], …is a place of renewal and re-dedication that strengthens 
our resolve and pledge that Zimbabwe shall never be a colony again. For, as we look at the 
pantheon of heroes and heroines who make our roll call today, what greater challenge, what 
greater patriotism is there, than to faithfully and resolutely guard that which cost us tens of 
thousands of lives to achieve? Where would our honour be if we were intimidated by 
imperialism’s tired trickery into letting go of our scared land? (The Herald, 10/07/2004) 
 
Mugabe uses the sacrifice of those who died for the liberation struggle to emotionally 
connect his listener to the land. Missing from the narrative are the reasons for taking 
land after 20 years of independence especially considering land was a clarion call for 
the liberation war. In addition those who died need to be respected and honoured by the 
living and this could only be done through rejecting the MDC which stands for 
colonialism and returning the ‘scared’ land to the whites. Through this remembering, 
national insiders and outsiders are defined as those who are working with imperialists 
and refuse to honour the heroes in the way Mugabe admonishes. Mugabe occupies the 
high moral ground and presents himself as a servant of the people and custodian of 
national unity. Many of those grovelling for favours from Mugabe have labelled him a 
son of God – the only one ordained to lead Zimbabwe. Notice how he appropriates the 
Messianic office and calls the deviants to repentance:  
Those who seek unity must not be enemies... Those who would go together with our enemies 
abroad cannot at the same time want to march alongside us as our partners in the nation-building 
efforts that are underway. We say no to them, they must first repent. There is room for them to 
repent, there is room for them to say we were wrong yesterday, we shall not be wrong 
tomorrow.... (The Herald, 16/08/2003) 
Mugabe is the one who can prescribe the desired code of conduct for belonging to the 
nation. This is informed by the misleading belief that it is ZANU-PF which was at the 
forefront of the war of liberation and therefore the rightful party with the title deeds to 
political power and national destiny. Controversially, ZANU-PF has used patriotic 
history and memory to argue that the history of the nation cannot be told without it 
anchoring the narrative. This is concomitant to Elgenius’s observation that 
‘[C]ontrolling the past is very much related to the formation of dominant narratives that 
help control the present’ (2011, 405). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009b, 1) argues that this 
incontrovertible monologic brand of nationalism enables ZANU-PF and ‘its leaders to 
claim control over the direction of national history; responsibility for the birth of the 
nation; uncontested right to perpetual power in Zimbabwe’ and the constitution of 
nationhood. The role ZANU-PF has played in the birth of the nation, even though 
selectively told, justifies the current social, political and economic order and legitimises 
the political power configurations that suggest that only Mugabe is God-ordained to 
lead the country. Nothing clearly demonstrates this than the narratives of the liberation 
struggle that, when not told on the Heroes’ Day celebration, find their way into the 
Independence Day commemorations as discussed below. 
Independence Day: victimhood and heroism in nationhood formation 
Independence Day commemorations magnify, to a large extent, the Heroes’ Day 
celebrations as they are intimately linked to Mugabe’s sometimes militaristic discourses 
on the constitution of the national identity in perilous times. In 1984 Worby observed 
the Independence Day celebrations choreography at a time when the decolonisation 
process was running concurrently with a fully blossoming genocide in the newly 
independent Zimbabwe. He describes the displays of grandeur and power thus: 
For a truly national spectacle, this event was an unmistakable pastiche: the British vehicles of 
state - an out-sized and curvaceous Rolls - brought forward the figurehead president, Canaan 
Banana, and behind him in a black Mercedes, the real power, then Prime Minister Robert 
Mugabe…the army - appeared in brightly coloured uniforms to engage in the kind of stiffly 
sequenced movements that embodied months of study in the Maoist art of mass performance. 
Indeed, the distinctly Chinese character of the orchestration was soon confirmed by the slogans 
pictured by thousands of card-bearers in the stands, a kind of instant, vivid graffiti intended to 
make legible and literal the marching formations, parachute manoeuvres, and spectacular 
flyovers by Soviet-supplied MIG bombers. The inscriptions that year advertised the virtues and 
values of socialist reconstruction. I remember watching avidly as the slogans promising Health 
Care for All, Education with Production, and so on, followed one another with a certain 
bemusing magicality - that is until the last mural of cards was thrust up with an abrupt and 
ominous finality. ‘Crush Dissidents’, it read. (Worby  1998, 565) 
 
The first decade (1980-1990) is similar in terms of tensions to that of 2000-2014 of 
Zimbabwe’s independence. In both periods Mugabe faced unprecedented and strong 
political opposition and had no other means to deal with opponents besides violence and 
vulgar often xenophobic or racist labels. Whereas the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) was the enemy then, this position is now occupied by 
opposition parties, white farmers, Western governments, NGOs and others. 
Most of Zimbabwe’s independence celebrations are used to propagate a version of 
history that borders on ‘patriotic’ history anchored on selective  memorialisation of the 
nation. This ‘patriotic’ history is not only used by Mugabe to demarcate the nation 
racially through the use of such binaries as white and black, but also uses the 
insiders/outsiders, indigenous/aliens and sell-outs/patriots labels; a clear demonstration 
of ‘the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating 
difference and otherness’ (Benhabib 1996, 3). This version of history departs from the 
nationalist historiography that Mugabe espoused soon after independence. ‘Patriotic’ 
history has been intimately married to Mugabeism1 and this has been conspicuous 
especially during commemorative events where Mugabe becomes a ‘prominent victim 
of certain historical developments’ (Lentz 2013, 226) like incarceration during colonial 
times and the interference of the West in Zimbabwe’s domestic affairs through the 
                                                 
1 Mugabeism according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009, 1139-1141) is a constellation of: ‘political 
controversies, political behaviour, political ideas, utterances, rhetoric and actions that have 
crystallised around Mugabe's political life... a populist phenomenon... marked by ideological 
simplicity, emptiness, vagueness, imprecision, and multi-class character’.  
 
MDC including assassination attempts. To illustrate his victim-cum-hero status, 
Mugabe asserts: 
I lost eleven years of my life in the jail of a white man whose freedom and well-being I have 
assured from the first day of Zimbabwe’s independence... I bear scars of [colonial] tyranny 
(Mugabe, 2007). 
We have heard that Mr Tsvangirai went and planned with some whites to be given US$500 000 
to behead President Mugabe. So do they think if they behead me this revolution would stop? … I 
survived many bombs even when we were in Mozambique. Throughout the war many bombs 
were sent to me through parcels and letters. (The Herald, 17/04/2002) 
What is clear from the extracts is that the white man is evil while Mugabe is a saint. The 
white man jailed Mugabe – the highest form of oppression- while Mugabe guaranteed 
the white man’s well-being – the highest form of sainthood. The white man is also 
willing to bribe blacks into killing Mugabe and the latter has been steadfast in fighting 
for Zimbabwe as explained in the second extract. Similarly, it is instructive to note that 
Mugabe’s appropriation of ‘collective’ victimhood is accompanied by the use of 
nationalist history, cogently diluting it with ‘patriotic collective memory’ to his 
advantage.  This is clearly demonstrated below: 
We also cannot forget the refugees and others - men, women and the children who were cut 
down in cold blood, often tattered book in hand, at Nyadzonia, Chimoio, Tembue, Mkuushi, 
Luangwa, Solwezi, where to this day, they lie buried in mass graves. Even in their death, we 
could not grant them the dignity of a grave each. How could we, given their severed limbs, their 
bodies burnt and charred beyond recognition? (The Herald, 12/11/2002) 
Above Mugabe, through pathos, evokes emotive experiences in an attempt to inculcate 
a sense of collective loss, makes a call for patriotism from citizens and offers what he 
wishes to be a collective view of the West or those perceived to be associated with the 
colonial dispensation as the country’s enemies. The use of the deictic expressions or 
first person plural pronoun ‘we’ ‘us’ and ‘our’ in most of his addresses denotes what 
Wodak et al. (2010, 45) describe as to ‘verbally annex and usurp... [where] a speaker 
can unite himself and his audience into a single “community sharing a common destiny” 
by letting fall into oblivion all differences in origin, confession, class and lifestyle...’. 
This buttresses the notion of indigeneity by pointing the former brutal foe and 
suggesting ‘him’ to be unchanging while ‘we’ have changed to accommodate ‘him’. 
More than anything, Mugabe’s nationalism has, over the years, morphed into an 
increasingly racist and tribalistic brand testifying to his toxicity as a leader (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009a; see Saul and Saunders 2005). However, that the white community 
failed to integrate into the Zimbabwean post-colonial society is not debatable as 
evidence suggests that after independence white people lived as a separate nation within 
Zimbabwe through segregated interactions by exclusively participating in what became 
known as white sports tennis, cricket, bowling, swimming and rugby. They also 
socialised at sports clubs most of which were exclusively white (see Mpofu 2014 and 
Fisher 2010).  
 
 During independence celebrations, public media juxtapose Mugabe’s narratives of a 
heroic past hailing citizens not to ‘merely remember but remember triumph’ 
(Esbenshade 1995, 72) with those of suffering under colonialism. For instance in April 
2002, while addressing a pre-independence party for children, Mugabe expressed this 
triumphalism thus:   
They (the British government) used to suppress us and when we fought we were fighting for 
democracy, they cannot teach us democracy, it is us who taught them democracy, they should 
shut their stupid mouths. That is why we say let the outsiders keep out and not interfere with our 
domestic affairs, we are an independent people, all our children are independent and we do not 
need anyone to tell us what to do and least of all those we pushed out. (The Herald, 17/04/2011). 
 
Accordingly, the suggestion in the above sentiments is that since Mugabe helped 
liberate the country, it is political deviance for anyone to challenge him. Mugabe’s 
brand of democracy, which here is narrowly reduced to liberating the country from 
colonialism rejects the conventional democracy characterised by freedom, human rights 
and justice. Thus Mugabeism exposes its contradictory nature when the narrative of the 
nation is reduced to decolonisation and nothing further especially concerning the 
behaviour of the post-colonial ruling elite. The post-colonial Zimbabwe is one 
characterised by racism, nepotism, tribalism, anti-colonial discourse, anti-democratic 
and inconsistent on any policy. Also, colonial memory and patriotic history are used and 
passed on to children in an attempt to capture and instil in them a strong sense of 
community. Bodner (cited in Osborne 2001, 9) expounds on this by saying that 
‘dogmatic formalism’ of ‘official memory is advanced by the elites who are committed 
to social unity, the continuity of particular institutions, and the cultivation of loyalty to 
them…’ Mugabe’s addresses on national holidays besides demonstrating some aspects 
of toxic leadership help salvage his political legitimacy and maintain dominant 
narratives on nationhood making both he and ZANU-PF the fulcrum of such discourses.  
 
Besides the victimhood narrative, the president employs triumphalist discourse in an 
attempt to reclaim his seemingly waning political hegemony in his party and nation. 
This is done through footnoting of PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA-rival nationalist movement 
and its military wing respectively and deploying  a skewed triumphal discourse 
attributed only to ZANU-PF and its military wing, ZANLA,  a clear attempt at 
cementing Mugabe and ZANU-PF‘s hegemony in Zimbabwe’s body politic. The 
romanticised accounts constructed under the hangover of nationalist triumphalism fail 
to pay due regard to the various actors in the liberation war of the country cultivating a 
sense of entitlement to continue ruling Zimbabwe by Mugabe.  
Historical events, especially the war of liberation, are mostly used to bring forth this 
theme of triumphalism. A number of extracts quoted at length help qualify this 
assertion: 
 We use the day to affirm to them that the same spirit of patriotism, which 
propelled their valiant sons and daughters to battle, today immanently 
pervades and guards this nation, quick to chastise any of its citizens who 
dare betray the cause by pawning our hard-won Independence. Dear 
Zimbabweans, it gives me immeasurable pleasure to be able to tell you that 
the land which, for over a century and a decade we yearned to recover, has 
indeed finally come back. It has been delivered back to you who are its rightful 
owners. It has come back, notwithstanding the obstacles presented at every 
step of the way, by powerful western interests…… Even our own detractors 
grudgingly acknowledge the strides we have made in education and 
manpower development, health and child welfare, horticulture and 
forestry, mining and infrastructural development. (The Herald, 
19/08/2003) (Emphasis added). 
 
 Today, we once again celebrate, as free and proud Zimbabweans, our 
country's anniversary of Independence. We celebrate this 24th 
anniversary of our freedom with a stronger sense of unity and cohesion at 
home, and a strong sense of place and identity internationally. We face the 
future with confidence, hope and dignity. …The last four years presented us a 
number of challenges and real trials for our country. Yet they have been 
years also of break-throughs arising from our firm and indomitable stand 
on matters of national sovereignty and economic freedom, the high point 
being the fulfillment of our liberation war goal of recovering and 
regaining the ownership and control of our land, and distributing it to our 
people. (The Herald, 19/08/2004) (Emphasis added). 
 
 This birth followed bitter struggles and wars of resistance waged by our 
people for nearly a century, struggles meant to dislodge British settler 
colonialism, which in 1890, had planted itself on our soil through force of 
arms. (The Herald, 19/08/2005) (Emphasis added). 
 
 ...hard-won Independence and freedom from the shackles of British 
colonialist and imperialist domination… Government will continue to 
allocate significant resources to ensure sustained defence of our hard-won 
Independence, sovereignty and self-determination… resilience… [to have] 
resisted the brazen attempts of our detractors, openly working in cahoots 
with their shameless local puppets, to reverse the gains our Independence 
through their ‘regime change’ agenda. (The Herald, 19/08/2007) (Emphasis 
added). 
 
These summarise most of Mugabe’s post-2000 speeches since independence. From 
these statements, it is evident that Mugabe historicises Zimbabwe’s wars at different 
epochs, praising his supporters and vilifying his opponents. He evokes the suffering of 
those who fought in the liberation struggle to invoke his listeners’ commitment, unity 
and support to his policies central of which is the land and economic freedom. First, 
there is the battle to free the country from colonialists; second, the one to repossess the 
land and third, to ward off threats from former colonisers who want to ‘reverse the gains 
of our independence’ through their ‘shameless local puppets’. In these statements 
Mugabe exercises and enacts power through discourse (Fairclough 2001). Mugabe, as a 
president, has access to fame, respect and social power which he uses to control the 
minds and actions of the people (van Dijk 1997) and manufacture consent.  Mugabeism 
is also used here to hail Zimbabweans into the imagined nation through the use of 
appealing words like ‘we’, ‘our’ ‘people’ and ‘dear Zimbabweans’. This subjective 
positioning of Zimbabweans as a collectivity, as a family, with Mugabe as a father who 
speaks authoritatively and persuarsively about where Zimbabwe, as a family, has come 
from is met with challenges of other members in this imagined family as he continues to 
speak strongly against enemies from outside and within. In addition, Zimbabwe is 
largely defined by the politics of ethnicity and this has defined power relations for a 
long time. The collective ‘we’ that Mugabe uses masks this. Appealing to people as a 
generic ‘we’ erases especially ethnic boundaries that define Zimbabwean politics 
helping consolidate national affections pivoted by land and the economy. Much as 
national holidays are commemorative events in ‘time and space’ meant to ‘reinforce’ 
affections of nationhood, Mugabe has used these to wage ‘wars’ against his real or 
perceived enemies within and without Zimbabwe. In the process the discourse is carried 
out in a belligerent one sided manner displaying little regard to other issues also 
clamouring for attention such as human rights, economy and development, thus 
rendering these national days contaminated.  
 
The speeches appear as diversion from the real political and economic issues 
bedevilling the nation, and as attempts to instil fear of the state’s repressive apparatus in 
the citizenry. Even though the structure of power in the nation is clearly top-down, 
Mugabe gives people an impression that power lies with them and whatever the 
leadership of the country does is informed by, works to the benefit of, and is done with 
the blessings of the ‘masses’. In most addresses, Mugabe salutes patriotic Zimbabweans 
for being heroic and withstanding the enemy’s attempts to recolonise Zimbabwe. The 
subtext in celebrating the heroic stance of  the ‘valiant sons and daughters (The Herald, 
19/08/2003) who participated in the ‘bitter struggles and wars … to dislodge British 
settler colonialism’ (The Herald, 19/08/2005) seems to be an attempt at justifying the 
use of violence against those perceived as enemies of the country so as a way of 
preserving ‘our hard won independence and freedom’ and prevent our ‘detractors… 
their shameless local puppets’ from reversing ‘the gains of our independence’ (The 
Herald, 19/08/2007). This, again, buttresses the argument that Mugabe is a toxic leader 
who picks and chooses, according to the moment, certain behaviours and rhetoric to 
exhibit and advance for certain political ends (Lipman-Blumen 2005). According to 
Lipman-Blumen (2005, 19-20) toxic leaders use some tactics such as: 
deliberately feeding their followers illusions that enhance the leader’s power and impair the 
followers’ capacity to act independently;  playing to the “basest fears and needs of their 
followers and others; “stifling constructive criticism and teaching supporters (sometimes by 
threats and authoritarianism) to comply with . . . the leader’s judgment and actions … identifying 
scapegoats and inciting others to castigate them… and … ignoring or promoting incompetence, 
cronyism, and corruption  
 
The dear leader mentality thus cultivated narrows the scope of national identity debates, 
as is demonstrated by these state controlled and dominated media and rituals that, even 
though giving an impression of the state-as-people-centred, it remains toxic, elite and 
aloof. In the process, the vanquished colonial enemy and its ‘puppets’ are defined, 
threatened and embarrassed. Fear of re-colonisation is planted into the hearts of 
ordinary Zimbabweans, and, instead of offering solutions Mugabe perpetuates what 
Lipman-Blumen calls ‘building a totalitarian and narrowly dynastic regime[s]’(2011, 
337). Mugabe presents himself as the only entity with solutions to the country’s 
challenges and, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, gives assurance that the 
country is safe. The following extract demonstrates this: 
 Cde Mugabe inspected the Guard of Honour after which detachments from the 
country’s security forces forming the guard declared: “Zimbabwe is a sovereign State, 
we shall defend it with our blood”, to the delight of the thousands in attendance. Some 
of the people in the crowd held up banners with messages such as “Zimbabwe has no 
place for sell-outs” and “Independence and Sovereignty for all times”. (The Herald, 
19/04/2007) 
 
Ultimately, Independence Day, like other celebrations, not only marks black majority 
rule but positions Mugabe and ZANU-PF on a higher moral ground as the only central 
entities to the wellbeing and political stability of Zimbabwe. While relevant and 
important to any democratic country, the theme of sovereignty gained currency sincee 
the early 2000 and this was expediently used to defend Zimbabwe against anyone who 
questioned Mugabe’s dictatorial style of leadership. These events are used to advance 
Mugabe’s narrow and politically limited discourse on national identity because they do 
not allow for the circulation of alternative versions of national identity being felt 
especially by the minority, marginalised and demonised sections of the broader society. 
Those who challenge him are labelled ‘sell-outs’ and alien to the nation. This again 
justifies their humiliation, annihilation and other exclusionary forms that distance 
patriots and other true Zimbabweans from them. 
 
Independence Day and other mythologies used in nationhood construction in public 
media make Mugabe a central and celebrated figure—a person of national significance. 
For instance, Independence Day celebrations are sometimes punctuated by rituals such 
as ZANU-PF Women’s league leading the crowds in songs that praise Mugabe. One of 
the songs goes thus: ‘VaMugabe Ndimambo, shumba inogara yega musango’ [Trans: 
Mugabe is a King. He is a lion that lives alone in the wild] (The Herald, 19/04/2004). 
Two extracts from The Herald below help to illustrate how the fundamental ideology 
behind the liberation struggle as per ZANU-PF’s script of national liberation war 
history is underpinned by Mugabeism. First, the Minister of Local Government Ignatius 
Chombo, argues that Mugabe is an embodiment of the liberation struggle. The second 
assertion buttresses this through suggesting that Mugabe’s decision to participate in the 
liberation war defined the country’s destiny: 
The venue where we are gathered is significant for a number of reasons.… Gwanzura Stadium is 
adjacent to Zimbabwe Grounds, which we all know was the place where Cde Mugabe made his 
historic speech in 1980. Furthermore,… this place is walking distance from Cde Mugabe’s home 
in New Canaan and so by all means … this is what can be called the cradle of our liberation.... 
Our leader, His Excellency Cde Mugabe spent 11 years in jail and many more at the forefront of 
the liberation struggle... (The Herald, 19/07/2008) 
 
 [T]he turning point in Zimbabwe’s liberation was indeed on… April 4, 1975, when Cde 
Mugabe crossed into Mozambique… to start the armed struggle in a military adventure that 
finally brought independence to Zimbabwe. (The Herald, 18/04/2006) 
 
Between 2000 and 2011, independence, just like other national holiday speeches, 
presidential speeches were usually laced with war language demonstrating Mugabe’s 
deep seated fears and also a determination in protecting the ‘country’s sovereignty’ 
‘rule of law’ and alert the nation to its past and present threats. On these days Mugabe 
gives an update on the state of the nation calling Zimbabweans to: 
remain united and vigilant against threats to its sovereignty manifesting in people and 
organisations purporting to be champions of democracy. … We celebrate this 24th anniversary 
… with a stronger sense of unity and cohesion at home, and a strong sense of place and identity 
internationally… The last four years presented us a number of challenges and real trials for the 
country. Yet [we managed by] …indomitable stand on matters of national sovereignty and… 
regaining the ownership and control of our land, and distributing it to our people. (The Herald, 
21/04/2004). 
 
Here ZANU-PF is portrayed as a party that has safeguarded the country’s sovereignty 
and restored the people’s dignity through the land reform. There is no denying the 
importance of land in agrarian based African communities but in the context of ZANU-
PF it is used as a substitute for valid arguments for democracy. The ‘report back’ 
sessions by Mugabe are made into moments of collective national pride and reflection. 
Lentz rightly says the ultimate goal in these ‘condensed moments of nation-building and 
state-making [is to enhance] citizens’ emotional attachments to their country’ and 
leadership (2013, 218). They also encourage them to work towards goals determined by 
the elite especially when the report suggests achievements and also ‘sharp self-criticism 
for opportunities missed and the frustrating shortcomings that continue to punctuate 
daily life’ (Lentz 2013, 218).  Mugabe occupies the role of a servant who is elected, 
then reports back. Legitimacy here is built not only through displays of repressive state 
apparatus embedded in pageantry, pomp and fanfare but also through communicating 
successes, challenges and failures. For Mugabe’s s continual stay in power to be 
justified the past (colonialism) is compared with the current dispensation and how good 
‘we’ are as ‘we have done much more’: 
... in the 25 years which have gone by. We have built schools, colleges, polytechnics and 
universities. We have trained teachers and expanded education at the primary, secondary and 
tertiary levels. We have educated our children and with a literacy rate of well over 86 percent.... 
We have also built health institutions throughout the country and have…  stepped up the training 
of health personnel, albeit against the challenges of induced skills flight. Today, every 
community has a clinic or health centre. ... Dramatic gains have been registered in opening up 
rural areas through greater infrastructural development. From a road and rail network designed 
to serve white interests, we have expanded the road network to bring hitherto neglected rural 
areas ... We have expanded rural electrification, covering the far reaches of our country... Our 
water sector has also enjoyed huge investments.... We have built many dams of all sizes in all 
provinces... we have built schools, colleges, polytechnics and universities and electrified rural 
areas. (The Herald, 19/04/2005) 
 
The same past 25 years have beenwere characterised by genocide, xenophobia, racism, 
underdevelopment especially in the Manicaland, Midlands and Matabeleland regions of 
the country. Thus Mugabe selectively tells a one sided story knowing fully well that he 
has social power to advance  hisadvance his ideologies so as to coerce Zimbabweans 
into sympathising with him. Postcolonial development patterns are set against colonial 
systems that, according to Mugabe, are represented by the MDC and continue to haunt 
the nation as: 
 
We... paid the price of British bondage for ninety long and arduous years of systematic assault 
and injury to body and soul as a Nation under occupation. To this day we bear the lasting scars 
of that dark encounter with colonialism, often described as civilising. (The Herald, 19.04.2005). 
 
This turns independence celebrations into arenas ‘of more or less open political 
campaigning’ (Lentz 2013, 218) and vilification of those who express different 
opinions. Also, ‘patriotic’ history and memory are used to look back and show how 
odious the colonists were compared to the humane Mugabe government. In the process 
citizens are expected to be grateful to ZANU-PF for bringing about the one-man-one 
vote democratic system justifying, covertly, the use of violence especially against 
‘opponents’ and their supporters. Mugabe’s assertions that: ‘The one-person-one-vote 
we have enjoyed since 1980 is a gain from our liberation struggle. Let it be remembered 
that it was the bullet that brought the ballot’, (The Herald, 19/04/05) demonstrate this. 
True to that, Mugabe has presided over a political system whose versions of democracy 
remain mysterious and where violence is a toolused to address differences. According to 
MugabeThus the gun (violence), has to protect the vote (Blair 2002, and Meredith 2002, 
Mpofu  2014) leading to a narrow definition of democracy as ‘one-man-one-vote’ 
something that has been a point of contention between Mugabe and his critics who have 
pointed out how the party has become increasingly intolerant towards dissent, violently 
treated its opponents, and disregarded human rights since 2000. 
 
GNU and national holidays 
The GNU period saw the continuation of frosty relationship between ZANU-PF, 
opposition and the West. However, there was an improvement in the economy as 
captured by Mugabe’s Independence Day speech in 2011. The GNU was meant to mend  
the political crisis that arose when ZANU-PF lost the 2008 election but refused to 
relinquish power to MDC. The solution to the impasse was a power sharing agreement 
between two formations of MDC and ZANU-PF. National holiday celebrations saw an 
attempt by ZANU-PF at toning down the events from being party commemorations into 
inclusive national ones through extending a friendly gesture towards the MDCs. One 
way of doing this was ‘to ban wearing of any party regalia’ (Willems 2013, 29). It also 
saw Mugabe want to re-engage with the West, adopting the rhetoric of inclusivity. In a 
Heroes Day speech Mugabe said:  
Recently, we have sought to re-engage the European Union on the issue of the 
immediate removal of the evil sanctions that are hurting our people. But no sooner had 
we started the re-engagement than we realised that the European Union is far from 
being sincere, as the bloc keeps on shifting goal posts. The European Union and 
America are keen to have our people continue suffering under the evil sanctions. Let all 
Zimbabweans unite on this matter, and with one voice, continue to demand their 
removal. (The Herald, 12/08/2010) 
 
The ‘re-engagement’ with the MDCs, hitherto seen as puppets of the West led to 
ZANU-PF’s re-engagement with the West – the masters. The extract above suggests the 
insincerity of the West and by implication that the MDC could not be trusted even in the 
coalition. This maybe the reason the opposition leaders were not give active roles 
during national holiday celebrations but resorted to boycotting and issuing statements 
via their websites and alternative media. Interestingly Mugabe’s views of the GNU were 
not consistent but fractious. The following extracts support  this assessment. The first is 
a quote from Mugabe’s Independence Day speech in 2011, and the second extract is 
from a speech delivered on Heroes’ Day in 2013 soon after the controversial  elections 
he won: 
The Global Political Agreement, with missed targets here and there, and outright 
misunderstanding on others, continued to be implemented… it laid the firm foundations for the 
prevailing political and macroeconomic stability in the country. (The Herald, 19/04/2011) 
 
May I also thank you most sincerely for bringing to an end the unproductive Inclusive 
Government and for restoring your confidence in the ZANU-PF government. (The Herald, 
14/08/2013) 
 
The above illustrates the ambiguity and slippery nature of national identity, imagined by 
Mugabe during the GNU period. In this period it was clear that ZANU-PF was in 
charge of the country and MDC played a subservient role. The negative labels accorded 
the MDC were suspended when expedient to Mugabe only to appear unedited after the 
July 2013 elections. The above statements also bring to question ZANU-PF’s sincerity 
in the GNU. The end of the GNU and the winning of the disputed election in 2013 gave 
Mugabe a chance at political regeneration- another facet of Mugabeism. The West, that 
is, Britain and America, remained with the label of consistent evil enemies during the 
GNU.  During a Heroes’ Day address Mugabe retorted: ‘we have some mad people in 
Europe who are defying international law…’ 
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion the article has demonstrated how Mugabe has evoked three classical 
rhetoric concepts in his ceremonial speeches and these are ‘ethos (presenting themselves 
as competent public officials and speakers), pathos (creating positive emotions and 
connotations in the minds of the listeners), and logos (appealing to logical reasoning)’ 
to affect and connect with the audiences (Sharif and Abdullah 2014, 322). He has used 
national holidays as some of the most enduring central stimuli to national affections not 
only meant as sites to ‘govern… sustain established national symbols and meanings’ 
(Chang and Holt 2009, 305) or amplify government policy but also to carve not a 
collaborative form of national identity but a dictatorial, racist, exclusive and narrow 
one. Instead of being days for advocating for unity, progress and diversity these days 
have turned into policy pronouncements, divisive and agenda setting fora for the rest of 
the year by Mugabe. Instead of being moments of nation-building and state-making in 
Zimbabwe they have assumed a toxic nature through the way they have been used for 
selfish ends with an openly anti-Blair, anti-British and anti-MDC obsession that are not 
the sole sources of Zimbabwe’s predicament. It is clear from the foregoing that 
Mugabe’s ‘processes of identity construction, maintenance and transformation are 
inextricably linked to processes of marginalization, stigmatization and exclusion’ 
(Mehelj et al. 2009, 41). Through these holidays Mugabe, on behalf of ZANU-PF, has 
forcefully used colonial memory, toxic leadership tactics and a mixture of  staged 
victimhood and triumphalism to conjure up a history that argues for his legitimacy and 
dominance in Zimbabwe’s politics. These performances have served a critical function. 
They have not only of obfuscated what is negative about Mugabe but citizens have been 
turned property of ZANU-PF and made players in the nation-building process through 
well-orchestrated and deceptive performances of state power, coercion and modes of 
address, albeit at the periphery. Mugabe has manufactured a national identity that has 
‘crystallised around the ideology of [land, war and has sought to] impose [himself] on 
the Zimbabwean political landscape through a combination of persuasion and violence’ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011, 2). The ideology of the liberation struggle is anchored in 
settling disputes (like the land reform) violently while conveniently calibrating the 
nation along racial and ethnic lines – suggesting the uneasiness, fragility and 
unpredictability of Mugabe’s imagined Zimbabwe. During the period under study the 
citizens, according to Bartov writing in a different context, are compelled to ‘conform to 
a definition they might not share, based on categories imposed on them… by a… 
political regime’ (Bartov 2000, 92) instead of ‘confirming, contesting and confronting 
their identities’ in a democratic manner (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009, 3). Ultimately 
Mugabe’s use and performance of the nation in these holidays has consolidated his 
power through commanding the nation and occupying a high moral ground from where 
he lectures, commands and promises to punish deviating citizens on Zimbabweanness. 
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